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SAFFORD UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT NO. 1 v. REDDING:
BALANCING STUDENTS’ RIGHTS
AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT’S
INTEREST IN PROTECTING THE
EDUCATIONAL PROCESS
CHRIS SUEDEKUM*

I. INTRODUCTION
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, concluded that Safford school
officials violated the Fourth Amendment rights of Savana Redding, a
thirteen-year-old middle school student, by strip-searching her in an
effort to locate prescription drugs.1 The Ninth Circuit further held,
dividing 6-5, that Assistant Principal Kerry Wilson, who ordered the
search, was not entitled to qualified immunity in light of the
constitutional principles the court found were “clearly established” at
the time of the event.2
On January 16, 2009, the Supreme Court granted Safford School
District’s petition for a writ of certiorari.3 Safford has raised two
issues: first, whether the Fourth Amendment permits school officials
to search a student suspected of possessing and distributing
prescription drugs on campus in violation of school policy; and
second, if the search does not pass constitutional muster, whether the
officials were nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity.

* 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008).
2. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1089.
3. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted,
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 987 (mem.) (U.S. Jan 16, 2009) (No. 08479).
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II. FACTS
A student at Safford Middle School approached Assistant
Principal Kerry Wilson on the morning of October 8, 2003, and
4
handed him a small white pill. The student, Jordan Romero, informed
Wilson that a classmate, Marissa Glines, had given him the pill and
5
that a group of students was planning to take the pills at lunchtime.
Wilson took the pill to the school nurse, who identified it as a 400 mg
ibuprofen, obtainable only by prescription.6 A student’s possession of
these pills violated School Rule J-3050, which prohibits students from
bringing any prescription or over-the-counter drug onto campus
without the school’s permission.7
Wilson went to Marissa’s classroom and asked her to gather her
possessions and accompany him to his office.8 Wilson noticed a black
planner located in the desk next to Marissa and asked the classroom
9
teacher to determine the owner. Opening the planner, the teacher
found several knives, cigarette lighters, and a cigarette, but Marissa
denied having any knowledge of the planner or its contents.10 Wilson
escorted Marissa to his office, where he instructed Marissa to turn out
11
her pockets and open her wallet. This search revealed several white
pills identical to the one Jordan had possessed and a blue pill.12 Wilson
13
asked Marissa where the blue pill came from, and she responded, “I
guess it slipped in when she gave me the IBU 400s.”14 Wilson asked,
“Who is she?” Marissa responded “Savana Redding.”15
Wilson asked a female assistant to take Marissa to the nurse’s
office for a more intensive search while Wilson located Savana
Redding.16 Wilson found Redding in class and asked her to gather her

4. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1076.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Brief for Petitioners at 2–4, Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, No. 08-479
(U.S. Feb. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Petitioner’s Brief] (noting that students are required to leave
medicine in the school office).
8. Id. at 6.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 7.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. (“later discovered to be Naprosyn 200 mg”).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 7–8.
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17
belongings and accompany him to his office. He then confronted her
with the planner, its contents, and the pills from Jordan and Marissa.18
Redding admitted that the planner was hers and that she had loaned
it to Marissa a few days earlier but told Wilson that the knives,
lighters, and cigarette were not hers.19 She also denied distributing any
pills to her classmates and claimed that she had never seen the pills.20
Redding consented to a search of her backpack, but Wilson did
not find any pills.21 Wilson then asked Romero, a female assistant, to
take Redding to the nurse’s office where she and Nurse Schwallier
22
privately conducted a more thorough search of Redding. The two
women asked Redding to remove her socks and shoes so they could
check for hidden pills.23 Romero next asked Redding to remove her
shirt and pants, and then instructed her to shake out her bra and
underwear to ensure that Redding was not hiding any pills.24
Confirming that Redding did not have any pills, Romero immediately
25
returned the clothes to Redding. April Redding soon after filed suit
on behalf of her daughter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that
the school officials had violated Savana Redding’s Fourth
Amendment rights by conducting this search.26
This incident was not the first time that Wilson or other Safford
school officials were confronted with drug use at Safford Middle
School. In 2002, a student brought prescription pills onto campus and
distributed them to classmates, which nearly resulted in the death of a
27
student. The student suffered an adverse reaction and had to be
28
airlifted to a hospital, where he spent several days in intensive care.
Even more recently—a week before the incident in this case—
Assistant Principal Wilson had met with Jordan and his mother and

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. 8.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
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learned that a classmate had given Jordan a pill that caused him to
29
become violent and sick to his stomach.
The incident was also not the first time officials suspected Savana
Redding of violating school rule J-3050. At a school dance that
opened the 2003-2004 school year, members of the school staff
detected the smell of alcohol around a small group of students—
including both Redding and Marissa—and later that evening
30
discovered a bottle of liquor in the girls’ bathroom. The meeting with
Jordan and his mother further supported the staff’s suspicion when
Jordan reported to Wilson that Redding had served students alcohol
before the school dance.31
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court’s decision in New Jersey v. T.L.O. established
the constitutional framework for reviewing searches of students or
their possessions performed by public school officials.32 Although
students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse
33
gate,” the Supreme Court recognized that “the school setting
requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public
authorities are ordinarily subject.”34 The Court concluded that the
warrant requirement, in particular, was “unsuited to the school
35
environment.” Instead, the Court sought to create a flexible standard
that would “preserv[e] the informality of the student-teacher
36
37
relationship.” The Court determined that “special needs” inherent
in the public school context justified adopting a standard by which the
legality of a search would depend on the “reasonableness, under all
the circumstances, of the search.”38
T.L.O.’s reasonableness standard sought to strike a balance
between students’ expectation of privacy and school officials’ equally

29. Id. at 5–6.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 6.
32. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).
33. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
34. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 339–40.
37. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (discussing the T.L.O.
standard).
38. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
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legitimate need to maintain a safe and orderly learning environment.
The standard “spare[s] teachers and school administrators the
necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of probable cause”40
and permits educators to focus their attention on “teaching and
helping students, rather than on developing evidence against a
particular troublemaker.”41 At the same time, the reasonableness
standard ensures “that the interests of students will be invaded no
more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving
order in the schools.”42
The Fourth Amendment43 does not require the “least intrusive”
search practicable in order to be reasonable.44 Instead, courts evaluate
the reasonableness of a school search by utilizing the two-prong test
described in T.L.O.: first, whether the search was “justified at
inception”; and second, whether the scope of the search was
reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the interference in
the first place.45 Ordinarily, a search is justified at inception “when
there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn
up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law
or the rules of the school.”46 Furthermore, a search is permissible in
scope “when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the
objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the
age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”47 In
assessing the scope of a search, judges may consider the nature of the
infraction. The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that a school
rule prohibiting certain conduct reflects a judgment by administrators
that the conduct is destructive of a proper educational environment
and courts should defer to those judgments, rather than attempting to
determine which rules are “important.”48
39. Id. at 340.
40. Id. at 343.
41. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 342 (majority opinion).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
44. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995).
45. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
46. Id. at 341–42.
47. Id. at 342.
48. Id. at 342 n.9 (rejecting the argument that some rules regarding student conduct are too
“trivial” to justify searches based upon reasonable suspicion).
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T.L.O. is the only case in which the Supreme Court reviewed a
school search based on individualized suspicion and applied the twoprong reasonableness test. In it, a school official searched T.L.O.’s
purse after a teacher reported that T.L.O. was smoking in the
49
bathroom. The Court held the search was justified at inception
because the purse was an obvious place to look for the cigarettes.50
Satisfying T.L.O.’s “justified at inception” prong requires officials to
possess reasonable grounds for suspecting that a search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated or is violating school rules.51 At
least one lower court’s application of this prong has held that a tip
from a student informant gave school officials reasonable grounds to
search another student for drugs.52
If a search is justified at inception, a court must then determine
whether the scope of the search actually conducted was “reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction.”53 In this prong of the reasonableness test, a court must
balance the student’s legitimate expectations of privacy against the
school’s interest in preserving order. In T.L.O., the Supreme Court
acknowledged, “[The] search of a child’s person . . . is undoubtedly a
severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy.”54
In considering whether a search was excessively intrusive, the
Sixth Circuit concluded that a search undertaken by school officials to
find money serves a less weighty governmental interest than a search
for items that pose a threat to the health or safety of students, such as
drugs or weapons.55 As a result, a strip search to locate money may not
be reasonable, but that same search might be reasonable if
56
undertaken to find drugs or weapons. This reasoning reflects the

49. Id. at 346.
50. Id. at 346 (noting that it was irrelevant that other “hypotheses” were also consistent
with the teacher’s accusation and focusing instead on whether the official had reasonable
suspicion justifying search).
51. Id. at 342.
52. C.B. ex rel. Breeding v. Driscoll, 82 F.3d 383, 388 (11th Cir. 1996) (ruling that a
student’s tip provided directly to administrators is a reliable source of information because of
the possibility of disciplinary repercussions if the information is misleading).
53. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342.
54. Id. at 337–38.
55. Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2005); Oliver v.
McClung, 919 F. Supp. 1206, 1218 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
56. Oliver, 919 F. Supp. at 1218.
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Supreme Court’s recognition that administrators possess a significant
57
interest in protecting students from the consequences of drugs,
especially because “[s]chool years are the time when the physical,
58
psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are most severe.”
Accordingly, the Court has described school administrators’ interest
in deterring student drug use as “important—indeed, perhaps
59
compelling,” because of the disruptive effects of drugs on the users,
the student body, the faculty, and the educational process as a whole.60
Several circuits have found strip searches reasonable after
balancing students’ interests against the interests of school
administrators. In Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. Consolidated High School
District Number 230, the Seventh Circuit held that school officials’
strip search of a male student they suspected of “crotching” drugs was
not excessively intrusive and therefore that the search did not violate
61
the student’s rights. In finding the officials’ strip search reasonable,
the court pointed to school officials’ efforts to minimize the intrusion:
the search took place in the privacy of a locker room; the two officials
were the same gender as the student; and the officials did not touch
62
the student during the search. Likewise, in Williams ex rel. Williams v.
Ellington, the Sixth Circuit concluded that a strip search by school
officials was reasonable in light of the size of the item sought: a small
vial containing suspected narcotics.63 In that case, another student had
informed school officials that she saw the plaintiff with a small vial of
white powder.64 After school officials searched the student’s locker
and purse, “it was reasonable for [officials] to suspect the girl may be
65
concealing the contraband on her person.” The court held that the
strip search was not excessively intrusive—because administrators
reasonably suspected Williams was concealing evidence of illegal

57. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002) (“The nationwide drug epidemic makes
the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school.”).
58. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 662; see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 (2007) (reaffirming that
school officials have a strong interest in deterring drug use among students).
61. Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1319 (7th Cir.
1993).
62. Id. at 1323.
63. Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1991).
64. Id. at 882.
65. Id. at 887.
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activity on her person—even though there was no information
66
suggesting where Williams might be hiding the drugs.
But even if a plaintiff can establish a deprivation of a
constitutional right, government officials are entitled to qualified
immunity, which protects them from civil damages, unless their
conduct violates a constitutional right “clearly established” at the time
67
of the events in question. The Supreme Court has stated that a right
is “clearly established” when the “contours of the right [are]
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
68
what he is doing violates that right.” Thus, the qualified immunity
defense “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law.”69 In obvious situations, the
presence of earlier cases involving “fundamentally similar facts” is not
necessary for a court to hold that a right was clearly established.70 But
in Wilson v. Layne, the Court concluded that government officials, in
the absence of a consensus on the constitutionality of the conduct,
should not be subject to damages when judges disagree: “If judges
thus disagree on a constitutional question, it is unfair to subject
[officials] to money damages for picking the losing side of the
controversy.”71 Thus, in Wilson, the Court held that government
officials were entitled to qualified immunity because the
72
constitutional question was “by no means open and shut.”
Many lower courts, reviewing searches under the T.L.O. standard,
have recognized school officials’ qualified immunity because the law
73
was not “clearly established” at the time of the search. For instance,
the Eleventh Circuit held school officials were entitled to qualified
immunity for a strip search of an entire fifth-grade class to find

66. Id. at 889.
67. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
68. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614–15 (1999) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987)).
69. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
70. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (noting that officials can still be on notice that
their conduct violates established law “even in novel factual circumstances”).
71. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617–18.
72. Id. at 615.
73. E.g., Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1991); Cornfield
ex rel. Lewis v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1324 (7th Cir. 1993); Jenkins ex
rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 1997); Beard v. Whitmore
Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 608 (6th Cir. 2005).
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74
Although the court found the search
twenty-six dollars.
unreasonable in scope, the court concluded that T.L.O.’s balancing
test did not provide fair warning75 and in most instances left “school
officials to speculate as to whether a court applying the balancing test
76
to specific facts would find a search unreasonable.” The Sixth and
Eleventh Circuits have repeatedly voiced concern that T.L.O. does
77
not provide enough guidance to educators or judges. For example, in
Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Board of Education, the Eleventh
Circuit remarked, “[I]t is difficult to discern how T.L.O. could be
interpreted to compel the conclusion that these defendants—or, more
accurately, all reasonable educators standing in defendants’ place—
should have known that their conduct violated a clearly established
constitutional right.”78 As a result, lower courts have been left “either
reluctant or unable to define” conduct that is subject to a § 1983 cause
of action.79
The Supreme Court’s decision in Saucier v. Katz mandated that
courts consider the constitutional question first, and only if a violation
is found are courts to decide whether the right was “clearly
established” at the time of the incident.80 Saucier reasoned that
deciding the constitutional question before addressing qualified
immunity benefitted both government officials and the public by
promoting clarity in the legal standards for official conduct.81 But in
January 2009, the Court reconsidered Saucier’s mandatory sequencing
and held that judges were “permitted to exercise their sound
discretion” in deciding whether to answer both questions in
evaluating qualified immunity.82

74. Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts (Thomas II), 323 F.3d 950, 952 (11th Cir. 2003).
75. Id. at 956.
76. Id. at 954; see also Beard, 402 F.3d at 607–08 (finding mass strip search without
individualized suspicion to find missing money unconstitutional, however, school officials were
still entitled to qualified immunity because the law did not “truly compel” the conclusion that
search was unreasonable).
77. Beard, 402 F.3d at 607; Williams, 936 F.2d at 886; Thomas II, 323 F.3d at 954; Jenkins,
115 F.3d at 828 (finding that the law was not clearly established so as to vitiate qualified
immunity for school officials who twice conducted strip searches of two eight-year-old second
graders over missing seven dollars).
78. Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 828.
79. Williams, 936 F.2d at 886.
80. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
81. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
82. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009).

DO NOT DELETE

4/21/2009 2:45:23 PM

436 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 4:427

IV. HOLDING
The Ninth Circuit in Redding v. Safford Unified School District
Number 1 began by setting out the New Jersey v. T.L.O. framework
for deciding whether the strip search of Redding met the Court’s
83
reasonableness requirement. The Ninth Circuit followed the
84
85
approach of the Second and Seventh Circuits to determine whether
the search was justified at inception and concluded that as the
intrusiveness of a search intensifies, the reasonable suspicion
86
necessary to justify the search should also intensify. The court
treated the searches of Redding as two separate inquiries.87 First, the
court considered whether the search of her backpack and pockets was
justified at inception and then moved on to consider whether the strip
search was justified at inception.88 The court concluded that Safford
school officials did not have a reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify
89
the highly intrusive strip search of Redding for hidden pills.
The court concluded that Marissa’s statement incriminating
90
Savana Redding was self-serving and unreliable. Assistant Principal
Wilson failed to fully investigate Marissa’s claim and lacked specific
91
information indicating a strip search would reveal hidden pills.
Furthermore, because the planner that Redding had loaned to
Marissa did not contain any pills, the planner “d[id] not make it
significantly more likely” that Redding was responsible for the pills
found on Marissa.92 Finally, the court noted that Redding did not have
a disciplinary record that would contribute to forming a reasonable

83. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008).
84. Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 596 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d
588, 589 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding, before the T.L.O. decision, that as the intrusiveness of a search
intensifies, the reasonableness standard approaches that of probable cause)).
85. Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir.
1993).
86. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1081.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1081–82.
89. Id. at 1085.
90. See id. at 1082–83 (noting that Marissa could have incriminated Redding in an attempt
to deflect personal responsibility).
91. See id. at 1083 (noting initial search of Redding’s possessions had not revealed evidence
linking her to the pills).
92. Id. at 1083–84.
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93
suspicion that she possessed drugs. Therefore the strip search was
94
not justified at inception.
The Ninth Circuit next addressed the scope of the search,
weighing the nature of the infraction against the intrusiveness of the
95
search. The court found that the nature of the infraction—the
alleged possession of prescription strength ibuprofen—“pose[d] an
96
imminent danger to no one.” The court also found that a strip search
significantly intruded on a student’s legitimate privacy expectations97
and held that a strip search was excessively intrusive in light of the
98
“minimal nature” of the alleged infraction. The Ninth Circuit
concluded that Safford school officials violated Redding’s
constitutional rights by conducting a strip search that was neither
99
justified at inception nor permissible in scope.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit considered whether Redding’s rights
100
were “clearly established” at the time of the search. The court
explained that some rights can be inferred from common sense and
101
reason, even when no factually similar cases can be found. The
Ninth Circuit held that T.L.O.’s legal framework put Safford school
officials on notice that under these circumstances a strip search was
not reasonable.102 The Ninth Circuit held that Redding’s rights were
clearly established and therefore Assistant Principal Wilson was not
103
entitled to qualified immunity.

V. ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit applied New Jersey v. T.L.O.’s two-prong
reasonableness test in a flawed manner because it mistakenly
considered the intrusiveness of the search in determining whether the

93. Id. at 1084.
94. Id. at 1085.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1085–86 (discussing the psychological trauma caused by a strip search).
98. Id. at 1087 (concluding that school officials had neutralized any danger the pills posed).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 1087 (explaining “common sense and reason supplement the federal
reporters,” and therefore it is not necessary to find a case “on all fours”).
102. Id. at 1088.
103. Id. at 1089.
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104
search was “justified at inception.” The Ninth Circuit followed the
approach adopted by the Second and Seventh Circuits, both of which
found that the level of suspicion needed to justify a search increases
105
with its intrusiveness. But the legal justification for this approach is
flawed. The Seventh Circuit did not cite any legal authority, not even
T.L.O., for its sliding scale approach, while the Second Circuit relied
106
on a case that T.L.O.’s framework has rendered inapplicable. In
T.L.O., the Court focused its “justified at inception” analysis on
whether the official had reasonable grounds for suspecting a search
107
would produce evidence the student was violating a school policy.
The proper question in this analysis is whether any search was
justified, leaving the type of search conducted for the later inquiry
108
into the scope of the search. Despite challenging much of the
evidence Assistance Principal Wilson relied upon, the majority
conceded that some search of Redding was likely justified in light of
the available information,109 which is sufficient to satisfy the first
prong of the reasonableness analysis.110
The second prong of T.L.O.’s framework, whether the search was
111
permissible in scope, is at “the heart of this case.” This prong
requires careful consideration of whether, based on all of the
circumstances, the search was excessively intrusive.112 The majority
significantly devalued the school’s interest in deterring drug use by
students, expressing a sentiment that is contrary to clear dictates from
the Supreme Court.113 The Ninth Circuit questioned whether the
prescription pills posed a significant threat, but the school policy

104. See id. at 1095 n.3 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (explaining that the intrusiveness of the
search should be considered in assessing the scope of a search).
105. Phaneuf v. Fraikin, 448 F.3d 591, 596 (2d Cir. 2006); Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. Consol.
High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 1993).
106. See Phaneuf, 448 F.3d at 596–97 n.4 (citing M.M. v. Anker, 607 F.2d 588, 589 (1979))
(holding that probable cause is required to justify highly intrusive searches even in a school
setting).
107. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985).
108. See Redding, 531 F.3d at 1095 n.3 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (describing why the two
prongs should be meaningfully distinct).
109. Id. at 1081 (majority opinion) (“reasonable suspicion may very well have justified the
initial search of Redding’s backpack and the emptying of her pockets”).
110. Id. at 1097 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 1103.
112. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 (considering the age and sex of the student, as well as the
nature of the infraction).
113. E.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995).
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prohibits possession of prescription pills, and school officials’ policy
114
determinations are entitled to deference.
Although hindsight might suggest the search in this case was
overly intrusive, the school officials faced a potentially dangerous
attention that necessitated prompt and decisive resolution. Assistant
Principal Wilson knew students had planned to distribute and take
115
prescription pills at lunch. Marissa, a student with firsthand
knowledge, claimed that Redding had given her ibuprofen as well as
an unidentified blue pill.116 Administrators were unsure whether
117
Redding had pills in her possession or if she was distributing them.
However, confronted with a dangerous scenario similar to one that
nearly killed a student the previous year, Assistant Principal Wilson
118
felt immediate action was necessary. Under such circumstances,
administrators need flexibility to respond quickly to address
situations that threaten student health or safety.119
The majority concluded that Assistant Principal Wilson had no
specific evidence giving him a reason to suspect that a strip search
would reveal evidence of the prescription pills.120 In a similar case,
however, the Sixth Circuit found there were reasonable grounds for a
strip search despite uncertainty about whether it would reveal
evidence.121 The small size of the item sought (a vial of white powder)
supported the administrator’s suspicion even though no specific
122
information suggested where the drugs might be found. The
majority’s analysis ignored similar facts surrounding the search of
Redding, and therefore bears a striking resemblance to the “crabbed

114. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.9.
115. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1076.
116. Id.
117. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 7, at 8–9.
118. Id. at 4–5.
119. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352–53 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (discussing purpose of T.L.O.
standard); see also Redding, 531 F.3d at 1103–06 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (listing factors that
should inform the “scope” inquiry, including the probability of success, the intrusiveness of the
search, the nature of the infraction, the ongoing nature of the threat, and whether the behavior
threatens students’ health and safety).
120. Redding, 531 F.3d at 1083.
121. See Williams ex rel. Williams v. Ellington, 936 F.2d 881, 887 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding
that even though the school found no evidence of drugs after searching the student’s
possessions, a strip search was justified because it was reasonable to suspect the student was
carrying the drugs on his person).
122. Id.
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notion of reasonableness” that the Supreme Court rejected in
123
T.L.O.
The scope of the search in this case certainly presents a more
difficult question, but even if the search did violate Redding’s
constitutional rights, those rights were not “clearly established.” The
Ninth Circuit found that T.L.O.’s legal framework gave Assistant
Principal Wilson fair warning that the search in this case was
124
unreasonable. But cases in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, also
applying T.L.O.’s reasonableness test, have held strip searches by
125
school officials constitutional on similar facts. Even in cases in which
courts found egregious violations of the plaintiff’s rights, school
officials received qualified immunity.126 Several circuits have explained
that T.L.O. simply does not give enough guidance to school officials
for the law to be clear.127 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that
when judges disagree about the constitutionality of conduct,
government officials should not be subject to civil liability for picking
the losing side of the controversy.128 Despite judicial disagreement
over the reasonableness of strip searches, the Ninth Circuit imposed
civil liability on Assistant Principal Wilson, a result clearly contrary to
the Supreme Court’s intentions.
VI. ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION
Redding has a strong argument that the scope of the officials’
129
search was unreasonable and violated her constitutional rights. Strip
searching a student to find prescription ibuprofen might be
unreasonable, even in light of the strong interest schools have in
123. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343.
124. Redding , 531 F.3d at 1088.
125. Williams, 966 F.2d at 887; Cornfield ex rel. Lewis v. Consol. High Sch. Dist. No. 230,
991 F.2d 1316, 1323 (7th Cir. 1993).
126. See Jenkins ex rel. Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 828 (11th Cir.
1997) (holding that officials were entitled to qualified immunity when, on two occasions, they
strip searched two eight-year-old students to find seven dollars); Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch.
Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 607–08 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that officials were entitled to qualified
immunity for mass strip search of over twenty students without individualized suspicion in order
to locate missing money).
127. Beard, 402 F.3d at 607; Thomas ex rel. Thomas v. Roberts, 323 F.3d 950, 954 (11th Cir.
2003).
128. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 618 (1999).
129. Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14–15, Safford
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, No. 08–479 (U.S. Dec. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Respondent’s
Brief].
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130
deterring drug use, but to prevail Redding also must prove that New
Jersey v. T.L.O. establishes a clear framework that put the officials on
notice that the search was unreasonable in her case.131 Redding will
argue that courts reviewing school searches have come to different
conclusions because the balancing test is fact-sensitive, not because
the law is unclear.132 Yet, Redding’s qualified immunity argument is
133
weak and it will be difficult to prevail on that issue.
Safford’s strongest argument is that Assistant Principal Wilson is
entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not “clearly
134
established” at the time of the search. The Ninth Circuit’s
conclusion that Redding’s constitutional rights were “clearly
established” does not seem true when multiple judges have concluded
135
the search of Redding was reasonable.
In addition to the
disagreement in this case, other courts have found similar searches to
be constitutional or found the officers entitled to qualified
immunity.136 It will be difficult, however, for Safford to prove that the
scope of the search was justified.137 Safford officials conducted an
extremely intrusive search without any specific evidence regarding
138
the location where Redding was allegedly hiding pills.
Although the Supreme Court could simply conclude that the law
was not clearly established and avoid the constitutional question, it is
likely the Court will fully address the merits of this case. The Ninth
Circuit, following the Second and Seventh Circuits, adopted a sliding
scale approach that unnecessarily complicates T.L.O.’s two-prong
139
inquiry. This case presents the Court with an opportunity to provide

130. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Reversal at 21, Safford
Unified Sch, Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, No. 08–479 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2009) [hereinafter U.S. Amicus
Brief] (arguing that the reasonableness standard would only permit a highly intrusive search if
Assistant Principal Wilson had a reasonable suspicion that the drugs were hidden in a place that
a strip search would reveal them).
131. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 129, at 18.
132. Id. at 10.
133. See U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 130, at 29–33 (concluding Assistant Principal Wilson
was entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established).
134. See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 7, at 49–52 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s qualified
immunity analysis ignored a vast body of relevant case law).
135. Id. at 52.
136. Id. at 50–52.
137. See U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 130, at 21 (recognizing that the search was not
justified in scope).
138. Redding v. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 531 F.3d 1071, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2008).
139. Id. at 1095–97 (Hawkins, J., dissenting).
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further guidance for assessing the reasonableness of school searches.
The Court should conclude that a search of Redding was justified at
inception, and may even conclude that despite the significant
intrusion, the scope of the search was permissible due to the special
needs of the school environment. Due to the current lack of guidance
for lower courts especially when determining whether a search is
excessively intrusive, the Supreme Court may articulate factors for
lower courts to consider.140 Even if the Court finds the search of
Redding was unconstitutional, Assistant Principal Wilson is entitled to
qualified immunity because the unconstitutionality of the search was
not clearly established.

140. See id. at 1103–06 (suggesting factors that would help define the contours of the scope
analysis).

